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We assess whether during the recent financial crisis banking systems in countries with more stringent 
prudential banking regulation have proved more stable. We find indicators of regulatory strength to be 
relatively well correlated with the extent to which countries have escaped damage during the recent crisis, 
as measured either by the degree of equity value destruction in the banking sector or by the fiscal cost of 
financial sector rescue. 
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1. Introduction 
If stability-oriented policies for the banking sector are effective, more stringent prudential banking 
regulation should, in principle, lead to more stable banking systems. The recent financial crisis provides 
one obvious opportunity for assessing whether this holds in practice. Among the features of the crisis likely 
to be remembered are the massive destruction of banking equity value and the substantial amounts of 
public funds that governments put up to banks’ rescue. As countries differ significantly with respect to 
both the magnitude of share price declines and the size of the rescue packages, we exploit this variation to 
investigate the evidence of an empirical link between the severity of the crisis and prudential regulation. 
For measuring the strength of prudential regulation, we rely on a new set of policy indicators covering 
eight distinct areas of banking regulation. 
2. Prudential regulation indicators 
We have constructed indicators of banking regulation for 40 countries, including all OECD countries, 
drawing on pre-crisis information on regulatory policies assembled by the World Bank.
2
 The indicators are 
                                                     
1. The authors are indebted to Sven Blöndal, Romain Duval, Jørgen Elmeskov, Sebastian Schich, Jean-Luc 
Schneider, Michael Tröge, and several members of the OECD Economics Department for useful 
comments. The usual disclaimer applies. The views expressed here are those of the authors, and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the OECD or its member countries.   
2 . The World Bank surveys, which constitute the by far largest part of the underlying information set, were 
released in 2007, 2003 and 2001, and cover the periods 2005/2006, 2001/2002 and 1998/2000, 
respectively. The last update of the panel database was published in June 2008. The information used in the 
construction of the indicators was subsequently verified and corrected by OECD member countries, thus 
improving the reliability of the available information. 
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based on answers to over 100 individual questions which have been categorised into eight subject areas: 
Capital Requirements, Liquidity and Diversification Requirements, Accounting and Provisioning 
Requirements, External Auditing and Information Disclosure Requirements, Entry Rules and Ownership 
Structures, Exit Rules and Disciplining Devices, Depositor Protection, and the Strength of the Supervisory 
Authority.
 
In addition to the eight area indicators we have built a summary indicator from the 
aforementioned area indicators.
3
 The appendix briefly illustrates the information underlying each of the 
area indicators, and a detailed description can be found in Ahrend et al. (2009).  
It is important to bear in mind that the information underlying the indicators generally reflects the de 
jure rather than de facto strength of rules. While data on the strength and independence of the supervisory 
institution is included, no information is available on how prudential regulations are implemented, or how 
well a regulatory regime works in practice. Even if for some areas of regulation only insufficient 
comparable cross-country information is available, the constructed indicators are relatively well correlated 
with available outcome-based measures of financial soundness in the banking sector.
4
 For example, 
countries which – following our regulation indicators - have stricter capital requirements tend to have 
significantly higher capital to asset ratios, while banks in countries with more demanding accounting and 
provisioning rules (as measured by the indicators) have higher provisions relative to their loans. Similarly, 
where our indicators show liquidity and diversification requirements to be more stringent, banks’ asset 
portfolios generally include a higher share of liquid assets. 
3. Links between prudential regulation and the financial crisis 
3.1 The crisis period 
 Between the first quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009 many banking share prices collapsed, 
wiping out large amounts of equity wealth. To examine whether there is a systematic link between the 
degree of equity value destruction and prudential regulation we compare share prices of more than 300 
individual major banks from 32 countries with the indicators of prudential regulation.
5
 More specifically, 
we regress the ratio of the share price at the end of the first quarter of 2009 to its price two years earlier on 
the 2005/06 value of the summary indicator for prudential banking regulation, as well as on each of the 
eight area indicators in separate regressions. On average, banking valuations in 2009 stood at 59% of their 
value two years earlier for the banks in our sample. We also include a non-financial share price index from 
Thomson Financial as a control variable in the regressions. This is meant to cover developments in 
country-related factors and differences in share price volatility that are not specific to the banking sector, 
even though it is not meant to represent a full-fledged model of banking share prices, for which additional 
data would be needed. 
 
                                                     
3 . This overall indicator is obtained by taking the average of the normalised area indicators. Normalised 
indicators are obtained by subtracting, for a given area indicator, for each country the cross-country mean 
from the indicator value, and dividing the result by the cross-country standard deviation. 
4 . A set of intermediate outcome indicators of financial stability has been assembled from the “Financial 
Soundness Indicators” and the “Global Financial Stability Report” of the International Monetary Fund, and 
tested for cross-country correlations with the regulation indicators. See Ahrend et al. (2009) for details. 
5. Only banks that are included in the Datastream Banking Share Price Index DSBANKS for the respective 
country were retained.  
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Table 1. Prudential Regulation and Bank Share Prices during Crisis Times 
Dependent Variable: Individual Bank Shares 2009q1 relative to 2007q1
Prudential Regulation Indicator 2
0.31 ***
(0.10)0
0.14 *** 0.10 **
(0.04) (0.04)0 0.028
0.05 ** 0.03 **
(0.02) (0.01)0.04 0.011
0.09 *** 0.05 **
(0.03) (0.02)0 0.02
0.32 0.54 ** 0.60 ** 0.82 *** 0.64 ***
(0.26) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19)0.24 0.02 0.01 0 0.25
Observations 322 322 322 322 322
R-squared 0.17 0.20 0.13 0.15 0.24
5
Summary Indicator Prudential Regulation
Share Price Development in Non-
Financials
4
Area Indicator: Entry/ Ownership
Area Indicator: Exit/ Disciplining Rules
Area Indicator: Strength of Supervisor
1 3
 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of countries, in brackets.  
 
 
The results presented in Table 1 suggest a significant cross-country link between the pre-crisis stance 
in prudential regulation and the remaining bank valuations after the crisis had hit, relative to the pre-crisis 
equity values. The size of the estimated coefficient for the overall indicator (column 1) suggests that 
improving regulation from the level of a country with moderately low regulation (which we define as being 
the country at the 25
th
 percentile of the cross-country distribution) to the level of a country with moderately 
high regulation (i.e. the country at the 75
th
 percentile) would have been associated with a 19% higher share 
value at the beginning of 2009, relative to 2007 share prices. Looking in more detail at the area indicators 
suggests that in particular stricter regulation with respect to entry and ownership rules (column 2), exit and 
disciplining rules (column 3) and the strength of the supervisor (column 4) were helpful in limiting the 
meltdown in banking equity values. 
We also estimate alternative specifications to check for robustness of the obtained results: All three 
indicators with a significant coefficient in individual regressions remain significant when entered 
simultaneously as explanatory variables in the estimated equation (column 5). Moreover, for all these areas 
we also obtain significant results when replacing the area indicators by binary variables indicating the 
lowest quartile of countries with respect to each area indicator. Finally, results are basically unchanged 
when using for each bank the overall amplitude of the share price swing, i.e. the distance between 
maximum and the minimum values instead of the value between early 2007 and 2009. These robustness 
checks are presented in Ahrend et al. (2009).  
3.2 A longer-term perspective 
 Steep declines in banks’ share prices during the recent crisis had often been preceded by spectacular 
share price increases in earlier years. With the benefit of hindsight, these increases may have partly 
reflected a financial bubble, with differences in price developments across countries possibly related to the 
stance of prudential regulation. In order to explore this possibility, we replicate the earlier analysis over the 
2002-07 period that corresponds to the run-up to the crisis, using the 2001 vintage of our indicators.
6
 As 
before, share-price developments in non-financial sectors are controlled for and appear to be significant. 
We find that a stronger prudential stance has been associated with smaller share price increases pre-crisis, 
                                                     
6 . These results, which are only described verbally here, are available in Ahrend et al. (2009). 
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with prudential regulations found to matter in the area of exit and disciplining rules and, to a weaker 
extent, as regards the strength of the supervisory authority.  
 To the extent that the strong share price increases in the banking sector in the years preceding the 
crisis had a “bubble” element, we can interpret a combination of smaller pre-crisis price increases and 
lower subsequent declines as indicative of a more stable banking system. However, less pronounced pre-
crisis increases are clearly preferable only if they are associated with larger share price increases over the 
pre-crisis and crisis period taken together. Another set of regressions, presented in Table 2, therefore 
considers as dependent variable the ratio of share prices at the end of the first quarter of 2009 to its 
respective value in 2002.
7
 The results in column 1 suggests that, ceteris paribus, a country with moderately 
strong average prudential regulation had about 30% more banking equity left in 2009 relative to the 2002 
value, compared with a country with moderately weak pre-crisis regulatory settings (note that this figure 
relates to the 2002 levels of share prices, which was substantially below the 2007 level used as reference 
earlier). In particular, accounting and provisioning requirements (column 2) as well as entry and ownership 
rules (column 3) are positively and significantly related with the post-crisis level of banking equity prices 
compared to their value seven years earlier. 
Table 2.  Prudential Regulation and Bank Share Prices in a Long-term Perspective 
Dependent Variable: Individual Bank Shares 2009q1 relative to 2002q1
Prudential Regulation Indicator
0.50 *
(0.29)0.974
0.17 **
(0.07)0.019
0.19 *
(0.1)0. 58
1.24 *** 1.28 *** 1.30 ***
(0.24) (0.25) (0.26)0 0 0
Observations 284 284 284
R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.35
321
Share Price Development in Non-Financials
Summary Indicator Prudential Regulation
Area Indicator: Accounting/ Provisioning 
Requirements
Area Indicator: Entry/ Ownership
 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of countries, in brackets.  
 
3.2 Banking sector rescue costs 
 Beyond price declines in banking equity, another salient aspect of the recent financial crisis has been 
the high cost to taxpayers of bank rescue packages. IMF analysis carried out in 2009 put the expected net 
cost from direct support to imperilled financial institutions, guarantees made by governments or central 
banks, and liquidity provisions at 4% of GDP on average across our sample of countries, ranging from 
close to zero up to 14% of GDP.
8
 To check for correlations with prudential regulation, we regress the 
estimated net fiscal cost on the 2005/06 value of the overall indicator, as well as separately on each of the 
eight area indicators (Table 3). We include two sets of control variables. At a minimum, we find it useful 
                                                     
7 . Alternatively, this analysis can be replicated using the third quarter of 2009, with very similar results. 
These results are available from the authors upon request. 
8 . See IMF (2009), Table 4. “Recovery rates”, which critically influence the cost of direct interventions, are 
estimated based on historical data from former banking crises. Estimates of the expected cost of guarantees 
are broadly based on the Contingent Claims Approach. The size of rescue packages likely reflects not only 
the severity of the financial crisis, but also other factors including inter alia the responsiveness of policy 
makers. 
  5 
to control for the fact that some jurisdictions host important global financial centers. On average, countries 
with global financial centers such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Switzerland have faced an 
above average net cost. A possible explanation could be that particular interests have been especially 
strong in financial centers, resulting in de jure based regulatory indicators portraying an unduly strong 
regulatory stance.
9
 Other specifications also examined different measures of the size of the financial sector 
as additional controls but these turned out to be insignificant.In a second set of regressions, we also add a 
control variable reflecting the monetary stance in the pre-crisis years.
10
  
Table 3.  Prudential Regulation and the Fiscal Cost of Financial Sector Rescue Packages  
Dependent Variable: Net Cost of Financial Sector Support Measures 
Prudential Regulation Indicator
-2.10 *** -5.91 ***
(0.61) (1.17)
0.002 0.105
-0.95 * -1.16 ***
(0.53) (0.38)
0.085
-1.25 *** -1.56 ***
(0.21) (0.22)
0
-2.02 *** -2.08 ***
(0.54) (0.50)
0.0010.08 *** 0.05 ** 0.08 ** 0.05 **
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
4.80 5.57 ** 5.83 * 5.67 * 3.78 * 3.99 *** 4.57 4.89 *
(2.85) (1.92) (3.17) (3.13) (2.11) (1.09) (2.81) (2.52)
0.105 0.079 0.087 0.118Observations 26 19 26 19 26 19 26 19
R-squared 0.331 0.65 0.292 0.49 0.447 0.74 0.583 0.67
1a 2a 4a1b 2b 3b 4b3a
Financial Center Dummy
Summary Indicator Prudential Regulation
Area Indicator: Accounting and 
Provisioning Requirements
Area Indicator: Entry Rules and 
Ownership Restrictions
Area Indicator: Capital Requirements
Monetary Policy
 
 Standard errors in brackets.  
The simple regression analysis seems to support the view that more stringent prudential financial 
regulation has helped to reduce the extent to which the financial sector had to be rescued. Our findings in 
column 1b suggest that the fiscal costs of the crisis would be about 1.5% of GDP lower in a country with 
moderately strong prudential regulation, compared with one having moderately weak regulatory settings 
(again defined as the 75
th
 and 25
th
 percentile of the distribution). In particular, stricter regulatory 
requirements with respect to capital (columns 2a and 2b) or accounting and provisioning (columns 3a and 
3b), as well as a stricter stance on entry rules and ownership structures (columns 4a and 4b) are associated 
with a lower expected cost of the financial crisis. As newly entering banks are typically expected to rely 
more on wholesale finance and less on deposits, more stringent entry rules may have led the banking sector 
to rely more heavily on depository funding, a feature that has been shown to increase the resilience of 
banks during the crisis (Ratnovski and Huang 2009). Additional unreported results suggest that both a 
more uneven stance across fields of prudential regulation,
11
 as well as a particularly lax stance in any one 
                                                     
9. As such, the financial center dummy would pick up a bias in the indicators. Alternatively, governments 
with financial centers may be particularly willing to put up the resources to guarantee the survival of a 
strong financial sector. 
10. The degree to which imbalances (as bubbles in housing or credit markets) build up prior to a crisis may be 
thought to affect the strength of the crisis. During the recent pre-crisis period, a (downward) deviation from 
a Taylor rule, which under certain circumstances could be interpreted as overly accommodating monetary 
policy, has been associated with strong price increases in real estate, and concomitant developments of 
housing investment and mortgage credit (see Ahrend 2010). A (downward) pre-crisis deviation from a 
Taylor rule may hence be expected to result in a larger need for financial sector bail-out, and hence a larger 
net fiscal cost, and this result is indeed found in our analysis. 
11. As measured by the standard deviation of the normalised area indicators. 
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field are associated with a substantially higher fiscal cost. This suggests that particularly weak regulation in 
one area and lack of overall regulatory consistency have been factors that could have added to the cost of 
the crisis. 
4. Conclusion 
We have presented evidence that financial sectors in countries with more stringent prudential 
regulation, as captured by a set of newly built indicators, were less affected by the recent crisis. While 
numerous factors have influenced the impact of the crisis on a given country, our findings provide 
evidence that even in a world where a country may not be able to fully insulate from global financial 
shocks, its system of prudential regulation can still be an important factor in reducing their impact. 
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APPENDIX 
With a detailed description of the indicator construction being provided in Ahrend et al. (2009), the 
area indicators roughly cover the following aspects of prudentially-oriented regulatory policies: 
 Capital requirements include minimum capital to asset ratios, variations of capital to asset ratios 
according to individual banks’ credit, market or operational risks, the application of simple leverage 
ratios, the acceptability of subordinated debt and of revaluation gains as capital. 
 Liquidity and diversification requirements include limits on exposures to single or related borrowers, 
limits on sectoral concentration of lending and liquidity reserves. 
 Accounting and provisioning requirements include information on accounting standards, definitions of 
nonperforming loans, disclosure of off-balance sheet items. 
 External auditing and information disclosure requirements include information on external auditing 
requirements and their disclosure to supervisors, the scope of legal action against auditors in the case 
of negligence and against directors in the case of erroneous or misleading information 
 Entry rules and ownership structures includes e.g. information on the granting procedure and 
requirements for entry licenses, disclosure of and limitations on the source of funds, ownership 
restrictions for related parties, limits to engagement in securities, insurance and real estate activities, 
and limits to foreign lending and ownership of nonfinancial voting shares by banks 
 Exit rules and disciplining devices include e.g. measures relating to the forced exit of banks, 
bankruptcy procedures for banks, and the powers of supervisors to override management decisions if 
the solvency of a bank is under threat 
 Depositor protection includes e.g. information on the existence and limits of explicit deposit insurance 
protection systems, the collection of premia to such schemes, and whether fees depend on banks’ risk 
profiles and co-insurance provisions 
 Strength of the supervisory authority include e.g. the budget and number of professional supervisors 
relative to the size of the sector, the number and frequency of onsite inspections, the ability of 
supervisors to change banks’ internal organisation structures, the protection of the supervisory agency 
from political interference and the protection of individual agency staff from law suits by banks 
